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Abstract 
Growth that reduces poverty is often considered pro-poor regardless of whether the poor 
benefit from it more than the non-poor. Such growth could simply be termed poverty-
reducing growth. This paper argues that for growth to be pro-poor it should 
disproportionally benefit the poor. The paper proposes an operational definition of pro-
poor growth that restricts it to the cases in which the mean income of the poor increases 
proportionally more than that of the non-poor. A new index is proposed based 
exclusively on the redistributional component of poverty-gap changes obtained through 
an exact decomposition. It is then shown that this component measures how pro-poor 
growth is over a given period based on the above mentioned definition. The paper 
further presents several indicators for evaluating and monitoring the ‘pro-poorness’ of 
growth over time and concludes with an empirical illustration for the case of Honduras. 
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ECLAC  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
FGT   Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
G    Growth component of poverty changes 
GDP    Gross domestic product 
H   Headcount  index 
MDG    Millenium development goals 
PBG     Poverty bias of growth 
PEGR   Poverty equivalent growth rate  
PG     Poverty gap 
PGC    Poverty growth curve  
PPG     Pro-poor growth 
R    Redistribution component of poverty changes 
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1 Introduction 
Poverty can be reduced through economic growth and improvements in income 
distribution. For decades, growth has remained the main target whereas redistribution 
has been largely neglected under the conception that the benefits of growth would 
trickle down from top to bottom of the income ladder.  
Growth is, however, a necessary but not a sufficient condition for poverty reduction. 
Moreover, inequality expanding distributional shifts erode and often cancel out the 
impact that average income increases could have on the extent of poverty. This is why 
the mainstream development economics debate has been slowly moving into focusing 
on shared growth or pro-poor growth.  
This paper, while strongly arguing in favour of the relative approach to pro-poor growth 
(PPG), purports to show a comprehensive review of the main methodologies to 
characterize and measure PPG that can be found in the literature. Most importantly, it 
presents a new pro-poor growth index and rate that evaluate growth in terms of whether 
growth has disproportionally benefited the poor and by how much. This index is unique 
in its intuitive interpretation and its ability to measure the extent to which growth is pro-
poor without incurring problems previous indices presented and which are discussed 
below. In addition, a series of indices to evaluate and monitor the type of growth are 
proposed which can be useful for policy formulation and assessment. 
The concept of pro-poor growth is not exempt from controversy, as we shall see in the 
following section where the two main different approaches are discussed. Section 3 
reviews the main literature and exposes the positive and negative aspects of the different 
methodologies up to date. Section 4 proposes a new pro-poor growth index and rate that 
can characterize the type of growth that has taken place over a period and measure how 
pro-poor it has been, which effectively allows for comparison between different periods 
and countries. Section 5 presents some indices, derived from the one defined in the 
previous section, which can help evaluate and monitor the extent of poverty reduction 
due to redistributional shifts. The paper finishes with the case study of Honduras where 
the new indices are used to explain its pro-poor performance between 1992 and 2007, 
followed by the conclusion and three methodological appendices. 
2  Defining pro-poor growth 
The current debate on the topic concentrates on two different approaches regarding the 
definition of PPG, namely the absolute and the relative approach. The former is based 
on a definition of pro-poor growth exclusively linked to a growth that reduces poverty. 
The latter considers growth to be pro-poor only when it disproportionately benefits the 
poor. 
Due to its income raising nature, growth is poverty reducing ‘per se’, unless its 
appropriation is so unequal along the different percentiles that the poor do not benefit 
from it, or unless it is accompanied by regressive changes in distribution favouring the 
non-poor and offsetting its benefits. Thus, most growth will be poverty reducing without 
disproportionally helping the poor. The kind of growth that Ravallion (2004) defines as 
pro-poor is in fact a growth that simply reduces poverty, and it could thus be named   2
poverty reducing growth instead. Following, inter alia, Kakwani and Pernia’s (2000) 
understanding of the term, for growth to be pro-poor it should benefit the poor 
disproportionately more than the non-poor or should ‘harm them less’ (Duclos 2008) in 
the case that per capita growth is negative—for instance when population grows faster 
than the economy.  
The latter approach is based on the semantic understanding of the term ‘pro’ as in 
‘favour of’, as argued by Son (2007). Following this, the concept of pro-poor, in terms 
of growth absorption, should favour the poor at the expense of the non-poor’s share. 
Arguably, it makes little sense that a poverty reducing growth is considered pro-poor 
while benefiting the non-poor more than or as much as the poor. Following a reductio 
ad absurdum, we could also call such a growth pro-nonpoor, which would lead us to a 
definition of pro-poor growth that is equivalent to that of pro-nonpoor growth.  
Going beyond the semantic juggling, the present paper proposes that pro-poor growth 
be distinguished from poverty reducing growth and focuses exclusively on the so-called 
relative approach to pro-poor growth involving disproportionately favourable benefits 
for the poor. The following section looks at the different practices in the 
operationalization of PPG that can be found in the specialized literature with a view to 
establishing a general overview. 
3  Pro-poor growth operationalization 
There are two different approaches to estimate whether growth is pro-poor in a relative 
sense. They coincide with the distinction proposed in Kakwani and Son (2006) between 
the partial and the full approach. The former has the advantage that it does not require 
specifying neither a poverty line nor a poverty measure. The downside is that it is not 
able to provide conclusive results in all cases, nor does it provide, in most cases, a 
measure of how much pro-poor growth is. The full approach instead, despite requiring a 
choice of poverty line and index, does have the potential to provide conclusive results. 
Moreover, and contrary to the first methodology, it does not take into account 
distributional changes that affect only the upper part of the distribution, focusing strictly 
on the effects in terms of poverty. 
In both cases, the pro-poor evaluation functions are expected to possess several 
properties. Duclos (2008) defines a set of axioms coinciding with those generally 
envisaged in the earlier literature (see Appendix 1), which can be taken as an intuitive 
ground on which to build any pro-poor measure. 
A number of authors have proposed ways to detect whether income changes during a 
given period have been pro-poor based on the relative and absolute approaches 
described above.  
Duclos (2008) starts with the above mentioned relatively general ethical axioms and 
proposes graphical methods to test whether distributional changes are pro-poor both 
under the relative and absolute approach. He considers ‘classes of pro-poor evaluation 
functions which show varying distribution sensitivity to the assessment of the impact of 
growth’ and, contrary to most methodologies, studies ranges of poverty lines instead of 
focusing on a fixed income level below which incomes are deemed poor.   3
Based on stochastic dominance, he derives tests for first and second order pro-poor 
judgements that allow for a categorization of distributional changes for a range of 
choices as regards the specific criterion by which a change is called pro-poor. First 
order judgements require all poor quintiles to grow above the average growth. Second 
order judgements represent a less strict case in which the poor as a group grow less than 
average but the poorer among the poor grow actually above average, i.e. a 
redistributional shift among the poor occurs. 
This type of evaluation provides a strong methodological framework as it considers a 
general pro-poor evaluation function. It also allows for a ranking of different 
distributional changes although it does not provide a measure of how much pro-poor 
these are. 
Essama-Nssah (2004) generalizes some of the prominent methodologies to 
operationalize PPG by means of imposing desired and progressively restricting 
properties on the coefficients of a general poverty measure or other indicator of social 
welfare. Taking poverty as the indicator of social welfare he derives the following 
measures:  
(i)  The Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) Ravallion and Chen (2003) divide by 
the headcount to use as a PPG index. It requires Lorenz-dominance of the 
final distribution over the initial one. 
(ii)  The Poverty Growth Curve (PGC) Kakwani and Son (2006) base their 
rate of PPG on defining it as the area that falls beneath the PGC. Again, 
Lorenz-dominance is required for the criterion to be unequivocal.  
(iii)  The Equally Distributed Equivalent Growth Rate (EDEGR) is defined by 
Essama-Nssah (2004) as the growth rate of the mean income when there 
is no change in the distribution plus a weighted average of changes in the 
slope of the Lorenz Curve. It does not entirely focus on the poor as 
distributional changes benefitting the upper part of the distribution can 
also account as pro-poor. 
To determine not only if, but also how much pro-poor growth is on the grounds of 
distributional changes specifically – but not only – affecting the poor, there exists a 
third methodology based on the decomposition of changes in poverty into growth and 
redistribution effects.  
A chosen poverty index of a given population can vary due to either overall gains in 
income or changes in the way this is appropriated, i.e. redistributional changes. The 
following two sections describe how to disentangle both effects in order to capture to 
what extent growth is pro-poor. 
3.1 Poverty  decomposition 
Different methodologies exist to assess the contributions of income growth and 
redistribution to the variation of poverty. Both components can be studied through 
regressions based on international data panels, time series for a given population and the 
calculation of differential elasticities.   4
Cross-country comparison presents great disadvantages, in spite of its repeated use for 
the justification of the trickle down development model, because it only estimates the 
average trends of their respective individual experiences. Furthermore, these 
experiences generally emerge from very different initial conditions of inequality and 
mean income (Kakwani and Pernia 2000; Kakwani et al. 2003). For this reason, it seems 
more appropriate to develop a PPG index that is based on case studies for each country. 
There are mainly three ways of quantifying the effects produced on the poverty measure 
by changes in the income mean and the distribution. The first one calculates elasticities 
by means of just one temporal observation (Kakwani et al. 2003), whereas the other two 
decompose poverty through observations corresponding to two points in time. 
Decomposing changes in poverty over a period, however, provides far more reliable 
information than these elasticities because no a priori distributional pattern is imposed 
on changes in income. 
Datt and Ravallion (1992) decompose poverty into growth and redistribution effects, 
plus a residual. Despite the presence of this residual of dubious interpretation and the 
arbitrary choice of the initial period as base for the decomposition, this method is still 
favoured by authors like Kraay (2004), although most later authors agree on the better 
suitability of the Kakwani–Shorrocks approach (Kakwani 2000; Mazumdar and Son 
2002; Son 2003b; Baye 2004, 2005; Dhongde 2005; Kolenikov and Shorrocks 2005; 
López Bóo 2006). 
The latter approach performs a decomposition based upon the Shapley method (1953) 
for Game Theory, and was applied by Kakwani (1993) to decompose poverty variations 
into growth and redistribution effects. Subsequently, it was formulated under a more 
general scope by Shorrocks (1999) for any kind of decomposition, including that into 
population subgroups. This approach decomposes the variation of poverty into an exact 
sum—without residual—of both effects by means of calculating their respective 
contributions when they are kept alternatively constant and the sum is centred on the 
mean values (Kakwani 1993; Shorrocks 1999) instead of on the initial ones (Datt and 
Ravallion 1992). In essence, the Shapley method calculates the marginal impact on 
poverty of ‘eliminating each contributing factor in sequence, and then assigns to each 
factor the average of its marginal contributions in all possible elimination sequences’ 
(Shorrocks 1999).  
By imposing a set of desirable axioms for the decomposition, Kakwani (1993) obtains 
the mean values of the growth and redistribution components, given by: 
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where P is the chosen poverty index, z the poverty line and μi the mean income of 
income distribution Li(p). 
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The decomposition can then be expressed as follows:    
(3)   ΔP = G + R  
Muller (2007) further contextualizes poverty decomposition methods within the frame 
of integral approximation for the decomposition into key drivers of any temporal change 
of a quantity. He points out that the Shapley-value method for poverty decomposition 
assumes changes in growth and distribution to be linear over time, AN assumption that 
seems reasonable as one can reduce the studied period down to what the availability of 
surveys allows.  
All this considered, it seems clear that the Shaply-value method presently provides the 
most reliable approximation to the decomposition of changes in poverty into growth and 
redistribution effects. 
3.2  Pro-poor growth indices 
3.2.1  Kakwani and Pernia’s pro-poor growth index 
Kakwani and Pernia’s approach (2000) is based on a pro-poor growth definition that 
involves an absorption of growth disproportionately in favour of the poor. The pro-poor 
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It assesses the type of growth depending on the values taken by Φ as follows: 
Φ > 1    Pro-poor growth 
0 < φ < 1  Trickle down growth 
φ < 0    Pro-nonpoor growth 
The authors propose a different definition of the index in case of recession and argue 
that during a recession the growth rate is negative and so is the growth component of 
changes in poverty. This misses, however, the fact that even during a period of growth a 
rapidly expanding population can outweigh the benefits of limited economic expansion 
and actually see its mean income shrink. Thus, the previous definition should be applied 
to periods with positive growth in the mean income whereas the following to periods in 
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and the corresponding classification is: 
Φ > 1    Anti-nonpoor recession (mean income reduction)   6
Φ < 1    Anti-poor recession (mean income reduction) 
Kakwani et al. (2003) go further and propose a poverty equivalent growth rate (PEGR) 
that simultaneously takes into account the magnitude of the total growth rate and the 
redistribution benefit the poor receive from this growth. It is defined as the growth rate 
γ
* that would produce the same poverty reduction as the real growth rate γ had the 
growth process not been accompanied by a change in inequality—that is, had all 
individuals enjoyed the same proportional benefits from growth. Mathematically: 
(6)   φγ γ =
∗  
where Φγ is the proportional rate of real poverty reduction.  
It is important to note that in order to obtain a PEGR with a consistent meaning, the 
definition of the Kakwani index Φ to be used must be the one defined for the case of 
positive growth, regardless whether it is so or not.  
3.2.2 Limitations of Kakwani and Pernia’s PPG index and PEGR 
Undoubtedly, the simplicity and easy interpretation of this index are clear advantages. 
Particularly as it can be then used to calculate the PEGR. Yet, it presents a series of 
shortcomings. First, the index is composed of two different definitions in case of 
expansion or contraction of the mean income over the period under study. This makes it 
somewhat little comparable with itself as the two formulae measure different things. 
Second, and most importantly, the formula defined for periods with growth diverges to 
infinity as soon as the value of G approaches zero. Note that even big improvements in 
terms of redistribution would not outweigh the effects in the formula of values of G near 
to zero. The same applies to the formula proposed for the case of mean income 
reduction, this time with the asymptote located at R = –G, which, again, is a quite 
common occurrence. This renders the index largely ineffective because slight variations 
of the components produce enormously different numerical values and thus the potential 
for comparison, evaluation, and monitoring of ongoing policies remains weak.  
Appendix 2 shows other grave operational shortcomings of this index as well as of the 
PEGR which, added to the limitations exposed in the above render them impractical as 
general tools for PPG assessment. 
3.2.3  Poverty bias of growth 
McCulloch and Baulch (1999) define the unadjusted Poverty Bias of Growth (PBG) as 
the poverty reduction keeping growth distributionally neutral minus the poverty change 
that actually occurred. That, in fact, coincides with the contribution of redistributional 
changes in income to changes in poverty, that is, what is represented here by R. They 
suggest that in order to avoid this magnitude depending on the length of the period 
during which changes in poverty take place, a more suitable index can be obtained by 
calculating the PBG as a proportion of the absolute value of the change that would have 
occurred with distributional neutral growth, i.e. the growth component of the poverty 
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These authors rule out dividing the redistributional component R by the number of years 
of the period under study. They argue that ‘this assumes that the reduction in poverty 
has been uniform between the two dates in question’, which the Shapley decomposition 
they use anyway does. Instead, though, they divide by the absolute value of G, which, 
again, makes use of the same assumption but without making it explicit. Dividing by the 
absolute value of G, however, brings us back to a similar problem encountered with 
Kakwani and Pernia’s PPG index, namely the asymptotic behaviour it presents for 
values of G near zero. Furthermore, they fall short from recognizing the significance the 
choice of the poverty measure being decomposed has as regards the interpretation of R 
in terms of pro-poor growth, an issue I shall raise further below. 
4  A new pro-poor growth index and rate 
Trying to find a PPG index that accounts for both the growth and redistribution 
components is basically a problem of expressing a two-dimensional magnitude with one 
scalar, something which is not possible. Dhongde (2005) overcomes this by 
representing both components within four quadrants and discussing the different 
possibilities. This, however, does not provide a unique comparable measure of pro-poor 
growth.  
Economic growth is a crucial factor for poverty reduction. However, the redistribution 
effects of income changes are increasingly taken into account because they have the 
potential of either strongly fostering or hindering poverty reduction efforts1. To conduce 
to poverty reduction, growth alone is a sufficient but not a necessary condition. The 
point of looking for a PPG measure lies in the fact that redistributional changes should 
be taken into account if poverty is to be tackled in a more effective manner, and targets 
such as those set by the Millennium Development Goals are to be achieved on time. 
This suggests that an operational PPG index could be exclusively based on the 
redistributional effects on poverty and later combined with the actual growth rate in the 
mean income to obtain a measure accounting for both effects. Such an index could be 
simply based on the redistributional effects on poverty changes, i.e. what is here 
referred to as R. A PPG index could thus be based on the unadjusted poverty bias of 
growth: 
(8)   Φ = –R  
Note that unlike PBG, Φ is not normalized by the absolute value of G. Also, as it stands, 
the index is valid for any choice of a general additive poverty measure. By accounting 
only for changes in the distribution of income, asymptotic problems can be avoided.  
The advantages of this choice are multiple, as will be showed further below when a 
concrete poverty measure is chosen. First, we have a fully comparable index, which 
                                                 
1  For an excellent discussion on this issue, see UNU-WIDER’s: ‘Growth, Inequality and Poverty. 
Prospects for Pro-Poor Economic Development’, edited by Shorrocks and van der Hoeven (2005).   8
does not diverge to infinity every now and then. Second, dividing R by the numbers of 
years of each period allows for setting, monitoring, and evaluating PPG targets, as we 
shall see in Section 5. Third, it can be easily calculated from income/expenditure 
surveys. Fourth, the index focuses entirely on how the poor fair in terms of poverty. 
Fifth, it does not only indicate whether growth has been pro-poor but also by how much 
it has been so. Sixth, its interpretation is intuitive and therefore potentially useful for 
policy assessment where there is a need for tools to be easily understandable for 
policymakers. Finally, it can be linked to the relative definition of pro-poor growth, as 
we shall see in the following. 
Before proceeding to find this link, it is worth discussing the limitations of this index. 
Particularly, that unlike previous indices, the proposed measure does not provide a value 
comparable to the growth that would have occurred had changes in poverty been 
distributionally neutral. It simply provides a measure of how much poverty has varied 
due to distributional changes, which can then be used to modify the actual growth rate 
of the mean income to obtain a PPG rate.  
Moving on, what follows explains the link between the index proposed for the 
operationalization of PPG and the definition of what pro-poor growth should be 
understood to be. As argued earlier, the relative PPG approach seems to be the most 
pertinent, implying that growth disproportionately benefits the poor. This criterion, 
however, is not completely specific. Arguably, an intuitively reasonable way to 
concretize this would be to declare growth pro-poor when the growth rate of the poor is 
higher than that of the non-poor or, equivalently, than that of the whole population:  
(9)   nonpoor meanincome poor γ γ γ > >  
A major problem is, however, that since some individuals will most likely make it out 
of or descend into poverty during this period, one cannot actually define a consistent 
group of poor. The composition of this group changes over time and it is not possible to 
simply calculate its growth over a period. Measurements based on the average growth 
among the poor percentiles compare the initial proportion of poor percentiles to the 
same proportion of lower income percentiles of the final income distribution, without 
this necessarily measuring how the poor grew. In order to do that, we should remove the 
anonymity axiom as Grimm (2007) proposes, but this is rather a tool for policy 
evaluation since it does not take into account the new poor or those born into poverty 
and arbitrarily relies on how the initial poor fare. As a complementary tool, however, it 
provides a useful insight into which groups benefited from growth if panel data were 
available. 
3.2.4 A PPG index linked to the relative approach  
A PPG index able to operationalize the relative PPG approach, implying by that a larger 
growth rate for the poor, shall satisfy two properties, namely that:  
(i)  it is positive (negative) when the growth rate of the poor is greater 
(smaller) than that of the non-poor; and  
(ii)  it is zero when the rates of income growth of these two groups are the 
same.    9
I show in the following that by using the poverty gap, this holds for the only case in 
which the group of the poor is defined: when marginal time periods are considered and 
neither the population nor the number of poor change. The new index is, however, 
applicable for the general case and fulfils the above mentioned desirable axioms 
specified by Duclos (2008) for a pro-poor judgement shown in Appendix 1. 
Let us recall here the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke’s (1984) class of poverty measures (FGT) 
defined as follows: 
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or, infinitesimally: 















where yi is the income of the person i-th, n the population size, z the exogenous poverty 
line and I(yi<z) a function that takes value equal to zero for all incomes over the poverty 
line and 1 for those on or below it. The α parameter is a natural number that allows us to 
obtain different poverty indices when varying it, thus providing complementary 
information on the ‘shape’ poverty has with regards to distribution, i.e. whether the bulk 
of the poor concentrate just below or far below the poverty line, etc. 
Taking α = 0, 1 and 2, we obtain the headcount index (H), the poverty gap (PG) and the 
poverty gap squared respectively. The headcount determines the proportion of poor 




P H = ≡ 0   
where q is the number of persons with an income below z. 
When α = 1 one obtains the poverty gap, which, by including a factor that accounts for 
the distance of each income to the poverty line, provides an index that shows the depth 
of poverty. Mathematically, the PG is calculated by applying: 







































Given their widespread use in the literature and graphic capacity to characterize poverty 
of any income distribution, the operational choice for the PPG index proposed here 
consists of choosing the redistributional component R of changes in the FGT indices.  
Let us first look at whether the R component of changes in the headcount index (RH) 
can satisfy properties (i) and (ii). Let us consider a hypothetical income distribution in 
which the poor are all well below the poverty line. Further consider a situation in which, 
after a certain period of time, all the poor have increased their income by a certain   10
amount insufficient to lift any of them out of poverty, whereas the non-poor have 
experienced no change at all in real terms. In this case, the headcount (H) would not 
record any change since all the poor have remained so. Despite the fact that this growth 
is clearly pro-poor in the relative sense, RH would be zero. We can thus conclude that 
the redistributional component of changes in the headcount index does not satisfy these 
two desirable properties and is not directly linked to the difference in growth between 
the poor and the non-poor. Concretely, this example shows how an income change in 
which the growth rate of the poor is higher than that of the non-poor does not imply 
negative values of RH because the headcount remains unchanged. Indeed, H is not a 
good index for poverty decomposition because, as Duclos (2008) puts it, the change in a 
poverty headcount following growth ‘hides the variability of the impact of growth 
among the poor; it also largely depends on the impact of growth on those closest to the 
poverty line’. 
Let us now look at the values of the redistributional component R for changes of the 
poverty gap. Taking constant prices and a poverty line z adapted to inflation, we can 
rewrite expression (25) in terms of two income distributions given by x1 and x2 over a 
period of time t = t2 – t1 and with initial and final mean incomes μ1 and μ2, respectively: 
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The first of the four terms accounts for the value of the poverty measure of the final 
distribution adjusted to the mean income of the initial one (μ1). That is, a change in the 
distribution holding income constant. Inversely, the last term represents the poverty 
value of the final distribution if there have not been any changes in the ‘shape’ of the 
initial income distribution, obtained by shifting the initial distribution upward to meet 
the mean income of the final one (μ2). We can then rewrite this expression as: 

























































where use has been made of the definition of the poverty gap shown in (13). The 
summatory functions’ indices q1 and q2 are the number of poor for the initial and final 
distributions, respectively, while N1 and N2 correspond to the total population in these 
two periods.  





































































I want to establish a link between the PPG index based on the redistributional 
component R and the relative PPG criterion defined by the poor growing faster than 
society’s average growth. As said earlier, the main problem in doing this is the inability 
to establish the group of poor. This can only be done for a marginal time period in   11
which neither the total population nor the number of poor change. It is shown below that 
only in this case can the link be established. The index does, however, fulfil the desired 
intuitive axioms enumerated above for the more general case where changes in 
population and the number of poor occur.  
If the population and the number of poor remain unchanged, N1 = N2 = N and q1 = q2 = 

































































Making use of the definition of average growth g over the given period, the mean 
incomes ratios can be expressed as follows: 
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Making use of (17), expression (21) can then be written as: 
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Which, by factorizing and rearranging the terms, can be finally expressed as follows: 




















As can be observed, the sign of RPG will be given by the difference in growth between 
the poor and the society as a whole. Whenever the growth in the mean of the poor is   12
higher (lower) than that of the whole society, the redistributional component of changes 
in the poverty gap is negative (positive), and the new PPG index proposed here 
 Φ = –RPG is positive (negative), showing growth has been pro-poor pro-nonpoor. If all 
incomes grow at the same rate, RPG equals zero and growth has been pro-poor neutral. 
To show this, let us consider the following population of five persons with initial 
incomes 1 to 5 and poverty line z = 3.5. We then study several possible distributional 
shifts and the associated values of mean income (µ), growth in the mean (g), growth in 
the mean of the initial poor (gp), changes in the poverty gap (ΔPG) and their 
redistributional (RPG) and growth (GPG) components.2 
Table 1 
Person Initial  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
A  1  3 3  2  5 1 2  0 1.2  1.05 
B  2  2 2  2  2 2 2  2 2.4  2.1 
C  3  3 3  2  3 3 3  3 3.6  3.15 
D  4  4  3.5  4  4 3 3  3 4.8  4.2 
E  5  5  3.5  5  1 6 5  7  6  5.25 
 
µ  3 3.4  3 3 3  3  3  3  3.6  3.15 
gp    0.33333  0.33333 0 0.66667  0  0.16667 -0.1666  0.2  0.05 
g    0.13333  0 0 0  0  0  0  0.2  0.05 
g-gp    -0.2  -0.3333 0 -0.6667  0  -0.1667 0.16667  0  0 
RPG    -0.0645  -0.1143  0  0  0.0286  -0.0286 0.0857 -0.0114  0.00007 
GPG    -0.0497  0 0 0  0  0  0 -0.0514  -0.0172 
∆PG    -0.1143  -0.1143 0  0  0.0286 -0.0286 0.08571 -0.0629 -0.0171 
 
                                                 
2  See Appendix 3 for an example with a much larger population.   13
 
Shift Description 
I  Pro-poor growth in which the PG is reduced through G and R (RPG<0) 
II  Pro-poor redistributional shift (RPG<0) 
III  Redistributional shifts among the poor are neutral if the PG remains 
unchanged (RPG=0) 
IV  Under anonymity, the exchange of incomes between two individuals is not 
captured by RPG (RPG=0) 
V Pro-nonpoor  redistributional  shift that causes one individual to fall below 
the poverty line (RPG>0) 
VI Pro-poor  redistributional shift that increases the headcount but decreases 
the poverty gap (RPG < 0) 
VII  Pro-nonpoor redistributional shift (RPG>0) 
VIII,  IX  Pro-poor neutral growth that increases everyone’s income by the same 
proportion; RPG is close to 0 and it can be seen in IX that it rapidly tends to 
zero as we enlarge the population and/or decrease the rate of growth 
(RPG=0)3 
As can be seen in Table 1, the sign of RPG generally coincides with that of the difference 
between the average growth and the growth in the mean of the initial poor (g-gp). In 
Columns IV and V, however, this does not seem to hold true. Income shift IV 
represents, under anonymity, no change at all and thus RPG equals zero. Nonetheless, g-
gp is negative because the growth of the poor has been calculated violating anonymity as 
it has been taken into account that A’s income jumped from one to five while ignoring 
that E fell from five to one. RPG  thus provides a better description since we want 
anonymity to hold. In case V, gp has again been calculated as the income growth 
experienced by the initial poor and does not account for one individual initially non-
poor who has fallen into poverty. 
In conclusion, the redistributional component of changes in the poverty gap is strictly 
linked to the relative PPG approach earlier discussed when there is no change in the 
population or in the number of poor. For the general case, it avoids having to define or 
choose a changing group of poor and allows maintaining anonymity. RPG is thus a 
measure with which we can evaluate, measure and interpret the redistributional changes 
that had an impact on the PG over a given period. Its value indicates the percentage 
poverty gap change due exclusively to redistributional shifts in the income distribution. 
Moreover, it satisfies all the desirable axioms proposed by Duclos (2008), including 
Kakwani and Son’s (2006) requisite that it be a monotonic function of poverty 
reduction.  
                                                 
3  It is shown in Appendix 3 that RPG also equals zero when larger populations experience an equal 
percentage growth for each individual.   14
Thus, the proposed PPG index is:  
(24)   PG R − = Φ  
If Φ > 0, growth has been pro-poor, and pro-nonpoor when Φ < 0. When it equals zero, 
the poverty gap did not experience any change due to redistributional shifts, implying 
that neither the poor nor the non-poor disproportionally benefited from growth. 
The choice is of particular interest for the case of many developing countries with 
limited or nil per capita growth, where poverty reduction efforts should not only depend 
on growth but also target income redistribution, particularly in highly unequal societies. 
The PPG index proposed here takes into account the redistribution effect on poverty 
whereas the growth effect can be accounted for through the growth in mean income. 
Following earlier literature, a new rate of pro-poor growth combining both contributing 
factors to poverty reduction can be constructed as: 
(25)   PG R − = Φ + = γ γ γ
*  
This new PPG rate equals the growth rate of the mean income (γ) plus the PPG index 
proposed above (Φ), which is nothing but the redistributional component of changes in 
the poverty gap. Note that while γ accounts for the growth in the mean income of the 
whole society, RPG focuses on the effects of income redistribution on the poor. 
Arguably, one could also choose growth in the poor’s mean income instead of the γ but 
it seems more useful to have a rate that captures growth for the whole society, 
modifying its value on the grounds of how income redistribution has affected the poor 
in terms of the poverty gap. When redistribution changes in income contribute to 
decreasing (increasing) the mean distance of the poor to the poverty line, then the PPG 
rate will show a greater (smaller) value than the actual growth rate in the mean income. 
Thus, any poverty reduction strategy should pursue the maximization of this new rate of 
pro-poor growth. 
Alternatively, the PPG rate could also be defined including a factor related to society’s 
inequality aversion instead of simply adding RPG: 
(26)   PG R ν γ ν γ γ − = Φ + =
*  
Given the per se arbitrary character of choosing a ν, using ν = 1 seems a natural choice 
and implies that every percentage point change in the poverty gap will produce a 
percentage point change in the PPG rate. Arguably, one could choose differently 
depending on the relative value one wants to place on the redistributional character of 
growth.  
5  Pro-poor performance: a tool for evaluation and monitoring 
If poverty reduction targets are to be met, it would be useful to resort to a PPG 
monitoring methodology that could help set targets and evaluate progress, particularly 
in cases in which lack of or slow growth alone is not likely to facilitate the achievement 
of such targets within the expected period. Thus, the need for poverty targets that rely   15
both on economic growth and redistribution so that poor progress on the former can be 
compensated for by fostering the latter. 
5.1  Time-adjusted PPG index 
In order to be able to compare the degree of pro-poorness of different periods or 
countries, we can define the time-adjusted PPG index (Φt) as the index for a given 
period divided by the length of this period in years. Note that this temporal 
normalization assumes, as McCulloch and Baulch (1999) point out, that the reduction in 
poverty is uniform during the given period. This does not pose any problem as long as it 
is used to analyse relatively short periods of time as some of the macroeconomic 





= Φ  
5.2  Time-adjusted PPG evaluation 
The PPG evaluation of the period under study can be based on the redistribution 
achieved in terms of poverty gap reduction compared to the one that would have been 
needed to completely eliminate the existing PG or to achieve a certain goal (PGg). Two 




= ξ   Poverty gap elimination pro-poor performance  
where Φt
EPG is the annual Φ necessary to lift all poor above the poverty line for the same 
experienced growth effect. The second one calculates how good the redistributional 




= ξ  Poverty  gap  target-based pro-poor performance 
with Φt
TPG being the equivalent to Φt
EPG but for a set poverty gap target different from 
zero. 
As can be seen, the first indicator (28) is a particular case of the second one (29) when 
the target poverty gap value is zero. Using expressions (4) and (24) the more general 
Φt
TPG can be calculated as follows: 
(30)   g PG i
TPG
t PG G PG − + = Φ  
where PGi is the initial poverty gap, GPG the growth effect contributor to poverty gap 
changes and PGg the value of poverty gap set as goal for the given period.   16
5.3  Target-based future performance trend 
It may be of interest to estimate to what extent growth has to be pro-poor in order to 
achieve a poverty gap reduction goal. For that we need to predict how GDP and 
population will evolve over a certain future period. Let us consider that either we have 
an estimation of the GDP growth rate for the whole period or it can be obtained from 
the compound annual growth estimates (n years): 
(31)   () () () ∏
=
+ = + + =
n
i
i n g g g g g g
2
1 2 1 1 1 ... 1 
Assuming that the growth in the mean income (γ) is proportional to the ratio GDP to 
population, we can express γ in terms of the GDP growth rate (g) and the relative 
increase of population over the period (gpop) as: 










Increasing every individual income by γ, we shift the income distribution to the future 
in a distributionally neutral manner. Alternatively, and as it is done in the case study 
that follows, one can also project the growth of the mean income extrapolating it from 
the trend shown in the last period available.  
We can then decompose changes in the poverty gap between the most recent income 
survey and the distribution obtained by expanding everyone’s income by the expected 
rate of mean income growth up to the chosen future year. This way we can calculate the 
growth component of the poverty gap reduction (GPG) if incomes increase in a 
distributionally neutral manner following the mean income growth pattern of the last 
few years. Having GPG and imposing a final goal value for the poverty gap, we obtain 
the redistributional component (RPG) needed to achieve the chosen goal within the given 
period. The target-based PPG index calculated from this RPG ( Φt
TPG) estimates the 
redistributional change in the poverty gap needed to reach a chosen target value for the 
PG given certain expectations of economic and populational growth. This, in turn, can 
be used to evaluate and monitor the trend that the PPG index, and thus redistributional 
changes, follow in subsequent years in relation to the one that would have led to 
achieving the target. Note that Φt
TPG can only be used as a trend because the actual rate 
of growth is only known a posteriori and the evaluation is based on future estimates of 
growth. 
Therefore, the proposed indicator to assess progress in terms of attaining a pro-poor 







= η  
This poverty gap target-based pro-poor performance trend is defined by the ratio of the 
annual PPG index observed in a certain period to the annual PPG index necessary to 
achieve a set PG target in a chosen period provided we have an expectation for   17
economic and population growth, or, alternatively, for the evolution of the mean 
income. 
The indices presented above help to evaluate progress toward some targets in terms of 
poverty gap values. The limitation is, however, that poverty targets such as those in the 
MDGs tend to focus on the headcount index instead. This notwithstanding, working 
with the PG decomposition enables us to categorize growth as pro-poor in a way which 
is linked to the relative approach defined by a growth that involves higher rates of 
growth for the poor than for the non-poor. 
6  Case study: Honduras 
This section uses Honduras’ household surveys4 income data and the moderate and 
extreme poverty lines (z) for rural and urban population provided by ECLAC (2002) 
and adjusted to inflation. National official poverty lines calculated by the INE are not 
employed since they do not follow inflation and occasional changes in the way they are 
measured imply that any decomposition of poverty is likely to also capture changes in 
the poverty lines themselves.  
Table 2 shows Honduras’ headcount and poverty gap percentage values for selected 




Moderate poverty  Extreme poverty 
Headcount Poverty  gap Headcount Poverty  gap 
1992  77.24 43.66 52.10 23.14 
1994  78.06 46.66 56.56 27.46 
1998  74.64 44.14 50.87 25.90 
2001  73.90 44.24 51.43 26.84 
2004  73.69 45.26 52.59 28.30 
2007  71.77 42.99 49.43 26.35 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
                                                 
4  The ‘Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples’ is carried out twice a year by 




Moderate poverty  Extreme poverty 
RPG G PG  ∆(PG) RPG G PG  ∆(PG) 
1992–94  1.49 1.51 3.00 3.04 1.29 4.33 
1994–98  0.65 -3.17 -2.52 1.26 -2.83 -1.57 
1998–2001  -0.54  0.64 0.10 0.47 0.47 0.94 
2001–04  2.61 -1.59 1.02  2.78 -1.32 1.46 
2004–07  1.41 -3.67 -2.26 1.06 -3.01 -1.95 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
The results of decomposing total changes in the poverty gap Δ(PG) for the periods 
determined by these years provide us with the redistributional component from which 
we obtain the pro-poor index Φ defined earlier. The decomposition results are presented 
in Table 3: 
Table 4 compares the difference between the mean income growth of the poor minus 
that of the whole population (poor-society growth difference) to the pro-poor growth 
index. As mentioned earlier, the poor are not the same group for the initial and final 
year within a period. Thus, I take the poor to be those below poverty line in the first 
period, i.e. the initial year headcount index (Hi), and the group composed of the Hi 
percent poorer population in the final year. If, say, in the initial year 60 per cent of the 
population are poor, we take their mean income growth to be the increase experienced 
compared to the 60 per cent poorer population in the second survey, regardless of what 




















1992–94 -4.39  -1.49  2.95  -9.88  -3.04  3.25 
1994–98 -2.19  -0.65  3.37  -4.32  -1.26  3.42 
1998–2001 1.82  0.54  3.40 -1.90  -0.47 4.00 
2001–04 -9.04  -2.61  3.47  -11.37  -2.78  4.09 
2004–07 -5.54  -1.41  3.94  -4.92  -1.06  4.65 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
   19
As can be observed from Table 4, the difference between the growth in the mean 
income of the poor and that of the whole society is strongly correlated to the pro-poor 
index proposed herein, as shown by the similar values obtained for the ratio. This 
confirms the suitability of using the redistributional changes in the poverty gap as an 
indicator of how the poor have fared in terms of mean income as compared to the non-
poor or the society as a whole. 
Thus, we can categorize the different periods in terms of their pro-poorness as follows 
(Tables 5 and 6): 
Table 5 
Moderate poverty 
Period GPG PPG  index  Φ  Type of growth 
1992–94  1.51  -1.49  Anti-poor reduction in 
mean income 
1994–98 -3.17  -0.65  Pro-nonpoor  growth 
1998–2001 0.64  0.54 Anti-nonpoor  reduction  in 
mean income 
2001–04 -1.59  -2.61  Pro-nonpoor  growth 




Period GPG PPG  index  Φ  Type of growth 
1992–94  1.29  -3.04  Anti-poor reduction in 
mean income 
1994–98 -2.83  -1.26  Pro-nonpoor  growth 
1998–2001  0.47  -0.47  Anti-poor reduction in 
mean income 
2001–04 -1.32  -2.78  Pro-nonpoor  growth 
2004–07 -3.01  -1.06  Pro-nonpoor  growth   20
Table 7 
Moderate poverty (%) 




1992–94  -1.49 -0.58 -3.30 -6.38 
1994–98  -0.65 -0.19 -1.50 -3.23 
1998–2001  0.54 0.17 1.20 2.36 
2001–04  -2.61 -0.87 -6.11  -12.69 
2004–07  -1.41 -0.47 -3.38 -7.42 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Table 8 
Extreme poverty (%) 




1992–94 -3.04  -1.18  -12.45  -23.65 
1994–98  -1.26 -0.37 -5.13  -11.59 
1998–2001  -0.47 -0.15 -1.80 -3.54 
2001–04 -2.78  -0.93  -10.90  -22.99 
2004–07  -1.06 -0.35 -4.18 -9.49 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
As regards the time-adjusted PPG Index, evaluation and future performance, the results 
are shown in Tables 7 and 8.  
Table 8 shows that extreme poverty has experienced regressive distributional changes of 
between 1.8 per cent and 12.4 per cent of the redistribution that would have been needed in 
order to completely eliminate the poverty gap. In the case of the moderate poor (Table 7), 
these have only experienced all but one single period of progressive redistributional changes 
when the annual redistributional component was a mere 1.2 per cent of what would have 
been needed to lift all poor out of poverty. Since the poverty gap has remained quite stable 
over the period studied, the PPG evaluation in relation to the goal of halving the PG shows 
results that approximately double those obtained for the total elimination of the PG. This is 
the result of the growth component remaining small. Halving the poverty gap would take 
approximately half the redistributional effort it would take to completely eliminate it. 
Finally, the target-based future performance trend is calculated by evaluating the annual 
redistribution (in terms of poverty gap decomposition contributions) that has taken place in 
the period 2004–07. This is compared to the one that would have been needed to halve 
1992s poverty gap by 2015 if the mean income was to increase following 2001–04s trend:    21
Table 9 
Target-based future performance trend (2015 goal) (ŋ;%)  
Period evaluated  Moderate poverty  Extreme poverty 
2004–07 -27.55  -30.22 
The results show that the redistribution that took place in the period 2004–07 was both 
against the moderate and extreme poor and had values of around 30 per cent of those 
needed to attain the chosen goals of halving 1992’s moderate and extreme poverty gaps.  
7 Conclusions 
The paper has shown a comprehensive review of the concepts and operationalization of 
PPG found in the literature. Going beyond the methodologies that determine whether 
growth is pro-poor but not to what extent it is so, it addresses existing PPG indices’ 
shortcomings and proposes a new index and rate of pro-poor growth.  
This index is based on the redistributional components of changes in the poverty gap 
and can be understood as the percentage reduction in the latter measure due to shifts in 
the distribution of income. Using the relative approach, it provides a measure of the 
intensity of pro-poorness, something no other previous index does. Moreover, it has 
been shown that the index is strongly related to whether the poor grow faster than the 
rest of society or than the non-poor. These properties make it a powerful tool for 
analysis and, as shown in Section 5, also for monitoring and goal setting, while allowing 
an intuitively meaningful interpretation potentially useful for policymakers. 
The PPG analysis developed here for the case of Honduras shows that in all but one of 
the spells considered between 1992 and 2007 for moderate and extreme poverty growth 
was either pro-nonpoor or there was an anti-poor reduction in mean income. That 
means, in most spells redistributional shifts benefited the non-poor or disproportionally 
harmed the poor. The policy implication is that if poverty is to be tackled in an effective 
manner, this consistent trend should be redressed.   22
Appendix 1: Pro-poor axioms proposed by Duclos (2008) 
Given the initial and final income vectors xi=(xi1,...,xin) and xj=(xj1,...,xjn), respectively, 
we consider a relative pro-poor change in which the poor experience a relative change 
in living standards that can be denoted by 1+g. Let us define a pro-poor evaluation 
function W(xi,xj,g;z) as the change in an evaluation function, typically a poverty index, 
where z is the poverty line: 
   ) ; ( ) ; 1 , ( * ) ; , , ( z x P z g x P z g x xi W i j j − + ≡  
The change from income xi to xj is pro-poor if W(xi,xj,g;z) ≤ 0 
Axiom 1 Focus on the poor: Let xi’ = (min(xi1,z),...,min(xin,z)). Then W(xi,xj,g;z) = 
W(xi’,xj,g;z). This assures that the assessment is focused on the poor and their evolution 
and not on those above the poverty line. 
Axiom 2 Population invariance: Adding to the initial or final population a replication of 
itself leaves W unchanged. It allows for changes in the size of population. 
Axiom 3 Population symmetry or anonymity: Let M be a permutation matrix of 
dimensions n x n and xi’ = M xi. Then W(xi,xj,g;z) = W(xi’,xj,g;z). That is, our measure 
of pro-poorness remains unaffected if the incomes of any two persons of a given 
distribution are permuted since we are not concerned on persons but on income levels. 
Axiom 4 Monotonicity: Let α > 0 be a positive constant and let xj’= (xj1,...,xjk+α,...,xjn). 
Then W(xi,xj,g;z) ≥ W(xi,xj’,g;z). Related to the Pareto principle, if the income of at 
least one person increases over the period, W should not increase but, in most cases, 
fall. 
Axiom 5 Normalization: W(xi,xj,0;z) = 0 if there is no distributional change, implying a 
neutral pro-poor judgement.    23
Appendix 2: Operational shortcomings of the Kakwani and Pernia’s PPG index 
Apart from its proneness to diverge to infinity discussed in the text, one can see from 
the expression (8) that the values of Φ in case of an ‘anti-rich per capita recession’ fall 
into two non-contiguous intervals: (- ∞, 0) and (1, ∞). Actually, the first interval is not 
accounted for in Kakwani and Pernia (2000), where Φ < 1 is considered to be entirely 
pro-nonpoor. To see this, let us consider a decrease in the mean income, then G > 0. If R 
is positive, i.e. there is an anti-poor change in the distribution, the values of Φ belong to 
the interval (0, 1) since regardless of the value of R the denominator will always be 
greater than the numerator. In the case of an anti-rich change with R < 0, we obtain 
values falling in the two intervals mentioned above, (- ∞, 0) and (1, ∞), depending on 
whether │R│is greater or smaller than │G│, respectively.  
As regards the PEGR, apart from incorporating Φ and thus the associated limitations 
described above, it presents an additional disadvantage. Theoretically, the PEGR should 
‘correct’ upward and downward the value of growth in the mean income depending on 
whether distributional changes in income have had a positive or negative effect on 
poverty changes, respectively. In the case of mean income growth this works smoothly; 
it does not, however, when G > 0. If the mean income suffers a reduction over the 
period studied, we have seen that the values of Φ can fall into three intervals, namely: 
(i) anti-poor recession with Φ Є (0, 1); (ii) anti-nonpoor recession with │R│<│G│ and 
Φ Є (1, ∞); and (iii) anti-nonpoor recession with │R│>│G│ and Φ Є (1, ∞). When 
constructing the PEGR the first two possibilities produce results which do not match the 
interpretation intended in the definition of this rate.  
For the first case, if one multiplies values of Φ greater than 0 and smaller than 1 by the 
growth rate in the mean income—which is negative for the case of the ‘per capita 
recession’ under consideration—we obtain a negative PEGR that is actually smaller in 
absolute value than the actual rate of growth. In fact, considering that it is a pro-nonpoor 
recession where the poor are disproportionately harmed, the PEGR should be larger in 
absolute value than the actual one with both being negative. In terms of interpretation 
this is clearly wrong. Similarly, if we look at the second case, a pro-poor recession 
where the distributional component is smaller in absolute value than the growth 
component, we find that the resulting PEGR is negative and greater in absolute value 
than the growth rate of the mean income. That is, the PEGR results for these two cases 
are interchanged.    24
Appendix 3 
Example of the link between relative higher growth for the poor and the redistributional 
component of changes in the poverty gap for a population of 10,000 individuals. It can 
be seen that the sign of RPG, and thus of the PPG index Φ, are consistent with that of the 
growth difference between the poor and the non-poor.  




comparison  Value of RPG 
Type of 
growth  Initial distribution 
- 6000 persons with an 
income of 2000€ and, 
- 4000 persons with 
9000€ 
Poor: +300 
Nonpoor: +2000  gpoor < gnonpoor  0.01 Pro-nonpoor   
Poor: +600 
Nonpoor: +2000  gpoor > gnonpoor  -0.01 Pro-poor 
Everyone: +1000 
increase  gpoor > gnonpoor  -0.14 Pro-poor 
Everyone: 10% 
increase  gpoor = gnonpoor  0 Neutral 
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